Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:00 am
Time: 12:00 am
Results for intelligence gathering
28 results foundAuthor: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Re Review of the Department's Anti-Gang Intelligence and Coordination Centers Summary: In January 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced that the Department had taken several steps to address gang violence. Among those efforts were the establishment of three new entities: (1) the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), which was established by statute in January 2006, integrates the gang intelligence assets of all DOJ agencies and other partner agencies; (2) the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC), established in June 2006 by the Attorney General, serves as a central coordinating center for multi-jurisdictional gang investigations; and (3) the Gang Unit, another Attorney General initiative created in September 2006, develops and implements strategies to attack the most significant gangs and serves as the prosecutorial arm of the Department’s efforts against violent gangs. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to examine the intelligence and coordination activities of NGIC and GangTECC (the Centers), and to assess the effectiveness of their contributions to the Department’s anti-gang initiatives.4 Specifically, we examined whether the Centers provide comprehensive gang intelligence and coordination services to enhance gang investigations and prosecutions in the field. In addition, we assessed the effectiveness of the Department’s management and co-location of the Centers. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2009. 79p. Source: Internet Resource; Accessed August 13, 2010 at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/i2010001.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/i2010001.pdf Shelf Number: 119241 Keywords: GangsIntelligence Gathering |
Author: National Research Council. Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security. Title: Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences Summary: The intelligence community (IC) plays an essential role in the national security of the United States. Decision makers rely on IC analyses and predictions to reduce uncertainty and to provide warnings about everything from international diplomatic relations to overseas conflicts. In today's complex and rapidly changing world, it is more important than ever that analytic products be accurate and timely. Recognizing that need, the IC has been actively seeking ways to improve its performance and expand its capabilities. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to establish a committee to synthesize and assess evidence from the behavioral and social sciences relevant to analytic methods and their potential application for the U.S. intelligence community. In Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences, the NRC offers the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recommendations to address many of the IC's challenges. Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow asserts that one of the most important things that the IC can learn from the behavioral and social sciences is how to characterize and evaluate its analytic assumptions, methods, technologies, and management practices. Behavioral and social scientific knowledge can help the IC to understand and improve all phases of the analytic cycle: how to recruit, select, train, and motivate analysts; how to master and deploy the most suitable analytic methods; how to organize the day-to-day work of analysts, as individuals and teams; and how to communicate with its customers. The report makes five broad recommendations which offer practical ways to apply the behavioral and social sciences, which will bring the IC substantial immediate and longer-term benefits with modest costs and minimal disruption. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2011 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13040#description Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13040#description Shelf Number: 121093 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringNational SecurityRisk Assessment |
Author: Bayer, Michael D. Title: The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National Intelligence Summary: A fundamental doctrine of the United States is the system of checks and balances, a system wherein political power is dispersed among various governmental elements so that no particular interests or segments can dominate the government — or the people. One of the most strident criticisms of the former Bush-Cheney administration has been that in the time of crisis and immediately after, and in the years following the 9/11 terror attacks, executive (presidential) authority had been greatly expanded during the strategic response to those attacks and was, according to some, abused — thereby skewing our revered system of checks and balances. Certain segments of governments are acknowledged to be tools of political power — particularly subject to political influences. In the United States the military is exceptionally susceptible to the political designs of the President and the administration because he is their direct-line Commander in Chief. It is also widely acknowledged that intelligence services are part of the political epicenter of governments, because they too are a vitally important direct-line tool of national leadership. As it happened, these are the two segments of our government that benefited most, in terms of power, mission, and funding, from the prosecution of the United States’ Global War on Terrorism. In fact, it had been asserted by former Vice President Cheney on U.S. national television (FOX) that the war on terrorism was an effort to be waged by the U.S. military and the U.S. intelligence services and not law enforcement. This book maps out how bureaucratic maneuvering in the aftermath of 9/11 led to the U.S. military/intelligence apparatus assuming primacy and garnering near exclusivity in the international aspect of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This ultimately resulted in the fundamental exclusion of some of the most powerful components of the vast international resources at the fingertips of U.S. law enforcement. The book argues that allowing this to happen was a big mistake — and an unnecessary one at that. The existing networks of international law enforcement are powerful in their own right, but globalization and concomitant worldwide reconfiguration of national sovereignty have greatly empowered inter-governmental networks (such as those of international law enforcement). This book asserts that law enforcement is especially conducive to the advantages aff orded to international networks because the “culture of the badge” provides an immediate basis of trust and commonality to build upon — a commonality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, ethnicity, and other categories of segregation. Furthermore, some international policing scholarship asserts that law enforcement entities seek their own autonomy away from centers of political power by striving to find better, more effi cient ways to serve the state and the public (corruption influences notwithstanding) and in so doing are given the leeway to do so. One way they do this is by engaging in informal means of doing business — seeking one-on-one interaction with foreign counterparts rather than going through multiple layers of bureaucracy and government. Those who work in international law enforcement understand implicitly and explicitly that using informal networks is how most international police business is accomplished — especially in this day and age of e-mail and cell phones. But it is not the power of the network alone that brings value added to transnational policing. It is the sheer volume of numbers of police that are dispersed throughout nearly every nation in the world — and who live and work at all levels of societies, from the back alleys and villages from where terrorism breeds to the wealthiest levels, from where political/religious terrorism is financed. It is the numbers of police combined with their mandates to gather and acquire information — whether for investigative or public security purposes. Police have always had a vested interest in gathering and tracking information about local troublemakers and criminal activity in order to maintain public order and, as such, are a natural resource of acquiring terrorism information — particularly in regard to cells which might be financing or otherwise supporting operations through criminal activity. It is the ability to conduct their business among multiple levels of societies and within populations at large which makes international law enforcement very likely the largest and most potent counterterrorism network on the face of the earth. Hence, the title of this work — The Blue Planet. The worldwide network of police is a formidable asset — made even more formidable by the investigative and arrest authorities bestowed upon U.S. law enforcement and its foreign counterparts. This book will demonstrate that the willful disregard of such a spectacularly valuable asset was not only foolhardy, but also served to deny the American public the measure of national security they would have been entitled had the process been honestly brokered and strategically considered. Instead, in spite of the best of intentions, the parochial interests of the most powerful agencies prevailed at the expense of our own citizens. Police can and do cooperate with one another internationally to combat transnational crime. Organizations such as Interpol and Europol exist for this purpose — but those organizations, while valuable, bring with them the burdens and inefficiencies of their own diplomatic formalities, rules, regulations, and procedures along with the accompanying bureaucracies of participating member governments. Informal policing has been around for even longer than formal arrangements, and evolved as an efficient means to deal with the internationalization of crime. Transnational terrorism is an extreme form of international crime, but it is very often supported by other types of organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking, weapons trading, and document fraud. One of the main objections from abroad of the U.S.’s conduct of the war on terrorism has been the perceived disregard for the “rule of law,” particularly among our European allies. While some critics might find the worldwide unification of law enforcement cause for concern, this work will argue that the potential for human rights abuses are far more likely under war conditions and intelligence operations than by globally enabled police. While the potential for human rights abuses certainly exists, national law enforcement elements respecting their own “rule of law” and the laws of counterpart nations will find the means to cooperate within existing legal frameworks. Th is work will also argue that international police cooperation is one way that weak nations can serve to build their own governmental infrastructures and contribute in a positive way to international relations. There will be those who will assert that the current manner in which the United States deals with gathering terrorism information from our present intelligence posture provides adequate worldwide coverage of the problem. But even a cursory analysis of the numbers of sources available to worldwide police networks versus rational estimates of intelligence assets will show those assertions to be implausible. There are also those who might argue that international police interaction is problematic because police are an instrument of force and are endowed with powers that can be abused. This concern is valid in that abuse of police powers can readily impact human rights. The idea of informal international police relationships that are unregulated and therefore lack accountability can seem a slippery slope. However, the trend since 9/11 has been to attempt to integrate law enforcement with functions of intelligence services — as what occurred in the United States with the FBI. This linkage is gaining acceptance and is being implemented throughout Europe but it is implicitly far more slippery. The intelligence service/law enforcement dichotomy is primarily one of legal versus extra-legal constructs. Intelligence services are extra-legal forces unconstrained by legality and matters of sovereignty — and they too can be, and often are, instruments of force. When the two are integrated, the idea of rule of law becomes moot because of the extra-legal prerogatives of intelligence services — “poisoning” the law enforcement function and therefore the rule of law. It is no coincidence that one of the hallmarks of a police state is the convergence of the legal policing and extra-legal intelligence functions. Law enforcement, on the other hand, is legally sanctioned and generally permitted to exercise its authorities for the benefit of the greater good. This work advocates solely for the legal and legitimate exercise of the rule of law through international police cooperation, whether through formal channels or through the much more powerful and effective informal networking. If a nation’s laws forbid informal police cooperation, so be it. But national governments should recognize the positive role that international police cooperation can serve — not the least of which is serving the right of the people (or the people of other nations) not to be exploited, molested, or harmed by external criminal forces. Eight years later we are still experiencing the after-eff ects of the 9/11 attacks. When the consequences can be nuclear, biological, or chemical, especially in these precarious times, can we afford to deny our public the benefits of such a powerful instrument of counterterrorism—the informal networks made available to U.S. law enforcement? Details: Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2010. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2011 at: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.ndic.edu/press/pdf/18507.pdf Shelf Number: 121720 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringInternational CooperationInternational Law EnforcementInternational PolicingNational SecurityPolicing NetworksRule of LawTerrorism |
Author: Finklea, Kristin M. Title: The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats. Criminals routinely take advantage of geographic borders. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders, subvert border security regimens, and provide illegal products or services. Many crimes — particularly those of a cyber nature — have become increasi ngly transnational. While criminals may operate across geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement may not be able to do so with the same ease. Moreover, obstacles such as disparities between the legal regimens of nations (what is considered a crime in one country may not be in another) and differences in willingness to extradite suspected criminals can hamper prosecutions. The law enforcement community has, however, expanded its working relationships with both domestic and international agencies. Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of both legitimate and criminal operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to carry out their operations remotely from their victims and members of their illicit networks. In the largely borderless cyber domain, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct illicit business. Further, in the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the technological capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals. Some criminal groups establish their own operational “borders” by defining and defending the “turf” or territories they control. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by its own notions of “turf” — partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. While some crimes are worked under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency, others are not investigated under such clear lines. These investigative overlaps and a lack of data and information sharing can hinder law enforcement anti-crime efforts. U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation, and technological implementation to confront 21st century crime. For instance, enforcement agencies have used formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces to assimilate information and coordinate operations. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement’s abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources — both monetary and manpower — to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: R41927: Accessed August 9, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41927.pdf Shelf Number: 122332 Keywords: Criminal NetworksCybercrimeCybercriminalsIntelligence GatheringLaw Enforcement |
Author: Schreier, Fred Title: Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations Summary: This paper discusses the role of intelligence, intelligence services and intelligence-led operations as crucial components of the efforts to counter the new risks, dangers and threats to states and their population. The end of the Cold War and globalisation has not only brought a multiplication of actors, sources of conflict and means to fight. Indeed, globalisation, accelerating techno-logical innovation, growing interdependence and vulnerability of modern states has dramatically enhanced the number and diversity of risks, dangers and threats. The fact that these are increasingly transnational in nature, originate more and more often from non-state actors and appear and mutate ever more quickly, renders the fight against them more difficult. This is particularly true for the unholy trinity of transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational organised crime (TOC) that have become the pre-eminent security challenges confronting the world and the new intelligence priorities. TOC is growing in volume, geographic reach and profitability, and is well positioned for further growth because it does, in many ways, have the most to gain from globalization. Growth and spread of TOC increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and, with it, of catastrophic transnational terrorism as proliferants and terrorists collude ever more symbiotically with TOC groups to move money, men and materials around the globe. The more the international order is threatened by asymmetric warfare of Islamistic terror networks, the more the threat perception will become multifaceted and chaotic if more actors can acquire WMD. These developments not only diminish the predictability of risks and dangers. The more diffuse and unpredictable the situation and the threat perception, the more difficult it will become to clearly distinguish between external and internal, civilian and military threats to a country, and between the strategic, operational or tactical levels of risks and dangers. More than ever before intelligence is the pre-requisite for all measures that aim at the effective prevention, disruption and suppression of these threats. But countering the pre-eminent threats from multiplying non-state actors that operate clandestinely requires more than just intelligence services. These threats can only be effectively counteracted, disrupted, pre-empted and prevented when the operations of all security sector organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven or intelligence-led. This requires a paradigm shift in national security strategy that not only entails a ‘whole of government’ approach and multilateral engagement, but a radical new approach with more intensive collaboration, interaction and information exchange by these organisations with the agencies of the intelligence community. This paper (1) sketches the main threats currently confronting all states. Part (2) elaborates what intelligence is and explains why intelligence is key to counter the expanding array of threats more effectively. Part (3) shows the application of intelligence and the contributions of intelligence-led operations to the fight against the pre-eminent threats. Part (4) explores patterns and problems of intelligence cooperation. In part (5) some of the implications which intelligence-led operations may have for democratic control, supervision, oversight and accountability are indicated. The paper ends with a list of key recommendations. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: DCAF Occasional Paper – No. 16: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://www.dcaf.ch/DCAF-Migration/KMS/Publications/Fighting-the-Pre-eminent-Threats-with-Intelligence-led-Operations Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.dcaf.ch/DCAF-Migration/KMS/Publications/Fighting-the-Pre-eminent-Threats-with-Intelligence-led-Operations Shelf Number: 123349 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringOrganized CrimeTerrorismWeapons of Mass Destruction |
Author: National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) Title: Practice Advice: Introduction to Intelligence-Led Policing Summary: The concept of intelligence-led policing underpins all aspects of policing, from neighbourhood policing and partnership work to the investigation of serious and organised crime and terrorism. Within the framework of the National Intelligence Model, the effective and efficient collection, recording, dissemination and retention of information allows for the identification of material which can be assessed for intelligence value and enables decision-making about priorities and tactical options. Where information has been derived from human sources, whether members of the public, criminals or police staff, additional risks and considerations arise about the management of such material. It is, therefore, important that staff understand the role that they play in the intelligence-led policing process, and how they can achieve the best results through knowledge of the following key aspects: the National Intelligence Model (NIM); the collection of information, including Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) issues and; the national Information/Intelligence Report (ie, the 5x5x5 process). This practice advice assumes no previous knowledge or experience of intelligence-led policing. It is designed as a quick reference guide for staff who are not intelligence specialists, but require an understanding of intelligence-led policing processes as part of their day-to-day duties. This includes team leaders/managers who have a key role ensuring that staff are fully briefed on their specific responsibilities. Staff involved in specialist intelligence roles, however, may also find the publication useful as an aide-memoir. Staff engaged in a training capacity can use the content to inform training products in relation to intelligence-led policing. This includes such national programmes as the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP), the Core Leadership and Development Programme (CLDP) and neighbourhood and community policing training. Details: Bedfordshire, United Kingdom: National Centre for Policing Excellence, Association of Chief Police Officers, 2007. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/Intelligence_Led_Policing_PA.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/Intelligence_Led_Policing_PA.pdf Shelf Number: 123858 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringIntelligence-Led Policing, Manual (U.K.)Police InvestigationsPolice Training |
Author: Mallory, Stephen L. Title: The concept of asymmetrical policing Summary: This paper examines the intelligence process and the strategies of problem-oriented policing, community policing, broken windows theory and Compstat. Each of these strategies requires more than just information. They require collection and dissemination of intelligence products and adjustments to meet the needs of different department and agencies. The research suggests that there is a lack of understanding by many police officers in the United States of the intelligence process and the value of analytical products to policing. There is a recognized need for training of police in the U.S. to achieve identification and understanding of crime, the trends and threats, and the nature and extent of the law enforcement response by employing critical thinking, or what is termed the intelligence process and intelligence-led policing. The paper introduces a new concept, asymmetrical policing, which is a response to the asymmetrical threats encountered by modern policing and the application of a variety of evolving strategies to modern policing. Details: International Police Executive Symposium, 2007. 21p. Source: IPES Working Paper No. 12: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.ipes.info/wps/WPS%20No%2012.pdf Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://www.ipes.info/wps/WPS%20No%2012.pdf Shelf Number: 123884 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringIntelligence-Led PolicingPolice InvestigationPolice Training |
Author: Monroy, Matthias Title: Using false documents against "Euro-anarchists": the exchange of Anglo-German undercover police highlights controversial police operations Summary: Examination of several recently exposed cases suggests that the main targets of police public order operations are anti‐globalisation networks, the climate change movement and animal rights activists. The internationalisation of protest has brought with it an increasing number of controversial undercover cross‐border police operations. In spite of questions about the legality of the methods used in these operations, the EU is working towards simplifying the cross‐border exchange of undercover officers, with the relevant steps initiated under the German EU presidency in 2007. In October 2010 [1], “Mark Stone,” a political activist with far‐reaching international contacts, was revealed to be British police officer Mark Kennedy [2] prompting widespread debate on the cross‐border exchange of undercover police officers. Activists had noted Kennedy’s suspicious behaviour during a court case and then came across his real passport at his home. Since 2003, the 41‐year‐old had worked for the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) [3], which had been part of the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) since 2003. The NPOIU was formed at the end of the 1990s to surveil anarchist and globalisation groups as well as animal rights activists. NPOIU and NETCU report to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), but recent media coverage [4] has led to the restructuring of undercover police operations in the UK with the Home Secretary withdrawing NPOIU’s mandate to lead. This decision follows on from the disclosure that some undercover officers had used sexual relationships in order to gain trust or extract information. Details: London: Statewatch, 2011. 16p. Source: Statewatch Analysis: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2012 at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-146-undercover-exchange-protests.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-146-undercover-exchange-protests.pdf Shelf Number: 124474 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringInternational CooperationInternational Law EnforcementInternational PolicingPolice OperationsPolicingPolicing Networks |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary Title: A review of national police units which provide intelligence on criminality associated with protest Summary: In 2010, revelations about the activities of Mark Kennedy, a police officer working undercover for the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), led to the collapse of the trial of six people accused of planning to shut down a large power station in Ratcliffe-on-Soar, Nottinghamshire. Later that month, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) announced a review of the systems used by the NPOIU to authorise and control the development of intelligence. This report outlines our findings and recommendations. The NPOIU was created in 1999 as part of the Police Service's response to campaigns and public protest that generate violence and disruption. Located within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), it was funded by the Home Office to reduce criminality and disorder from domestic extremism and to support forces managing strategic public order issues. The unit gathered and coordinated intelligence that enabled the police to protect the public by preventing crime and disruption. HMIC has reviewed: the supervision of undercover officers deployed by the NPOIU; the activities and supervision of Mark Kennedy specifically; the issues of management and supervision that arise from the case of Mark Kennedy, and how these might be strengthened; the ACPO definition of "domestic extremism"; the history, remit and governance of the NPOIU; and links between the NPOIU and the MPS Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). This report considers undercover police tactics when used to develop intelligence, rather than to obtain material specifically for a criminal prosecution. Conclusions and recommendations are made with regard to the level of intrusion into people's lives; the use of these tactics to tackle domestic extremism as well as to inform public order policing; and the extent to which the risks inherent to undercover deployments are justified and controlled. Details: London: HMIC, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 13, 2012 at http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/review-of-national-police-units-which-provide-intelligence-on-criminality-associated-with-protest-20120202.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/review-of-national-police-units-which-provide-intelligence-on-criminality-associated-with-protest-20120202.pdf Shelf Number: 124501 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.K.)Intelligence GatheringPolice OperationsPolicing (U.K.)ProtestsPublic Order Management (U.K.)Violent Extremism (U.K.) |
Author: U.S. Senate. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Title: Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Summary: Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism. Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations. Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with Federal funds, have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS’s support for and involvement with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed ability to strengthen Federal counterterrorism efforts. Under the leadership of Senator Coburn, Ranking Subcommittee Member, the Subcommittee has spent two years examining Federal support of fusion centers and evaluating the resulting counterterrorism intelligence. The Subcommittee’s investigative efforts included interviewing dozens of current and former Federal, state and local officials, reviewing more than a year’s worth of intelligence reporting from centers, conducting a nationwide survey of fusion centers, and examining thousands of pages of financial records and grant documentation. The investigation identified problems with nearly every significant aspect of DHS’s involvement with fusion centers. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work by the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner. Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010 assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found widespread deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. DHS did not share that report with Congress or discuss its findings publicly. When the Subcommittee requested the assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy. In 2011, DHS conducted its own, less rigorous assessment of fusion centers. While its resulting findings were more positive, they too indicated ongoing weaknesses at the fusion centers. The findings of both the 2010 and 2011 assessments contradict public statements by DHS officials who have described fusion centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy,”2 and “a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”3 Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such fusion center reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. Instead, the investigation found: The Subcommittee investigation found that the fusion centers often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever. • Nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections. • In 2009, DHS instituted a lengthy privacy and civil liberties review process which kept most of the troubling reports from being released outside of DHS; however, it also slowed reporting down by months, and DHS continued to store troubling intelligence reports from fusion centers on U.S. persons, possibly in violation of the Privacy Act. • During the period reviewed, DHS intelligence reporting suffered from a significant backlog. At some points, hundreds of draft intelligence reports sat for months before DHS officials made a decision about whether to release them to the intelligence community. DHS published many reports so late – typically months late, but sometimes nearly a year after they were filed – that many were considered “obsolete” by the time they were released. • Most reporting was not about terrorists or possible terrorist plots, but about criminal activity, largely arrest reports pertaining to drug, cash or human smuggling. • Some terrorism-related “intelligence” reporting was based on older news releases or media accounts. • Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of information shared with the National Counter Terrorism Center through a much quicker process run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center. In interviews, current and former DHS officials involved in the fusion center reporting process stated they were aware that “a lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless information,” as one DHS official put it.4 A former reporting branch chief said that while he was sometimes proud of the intelligence his unit produced, “There were times when it was, ‘what a bunch of crap is coming through.’”5 The Subcommittee investigation also examined DHS’s management of the fusion center counterterrorism intelligence reporting process. The investigation discovered: • DHS required only a week of training for intelligence officials before sending them to state and local fusion centers to report sensitive domestic intelligence, largely concerning U.S. persons. • Officials who routinely authored useless or potentially illegal fusion center intelligence reports faced no sanction or reprimand. The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of DHS, distributed hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to support state and local fusion centers. DHS revealed that it was unable to provide an accurate tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion centers efforts, instead producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS failed to adequately police how states and municipalities used the money intended for fusion centers. The investigation found that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it has spent on specific fusion centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were spent, nor has it examined the effectiveness of those grant dollars. The Subcommittee conducted a more detailed case study review of expenditures of DHS grant funds at five fusion centers, all of which lacked basic, “must-have” intelligence capabilities, according to assessments conducted by and for DHS. The Subcommittee investigation found that the state and local agencies used some of the Federal grant money to purchase: • dozens of flat-screen TVs; • Sport Utility Vehicles they then gave away to other local agencies; and • hidden “shirt button” cameras, cell phone tracking devices, and other surveillance equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a fusion center. All of those expenditures were allowed under FEMA’s rules and guidance, DHS officials told the Subcommittee. Yet none of them appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in the centers’ basic information analysis and sharing capabilities, so they could better contribute to Federal counterterrorism efforts. Every day, tens of thousands of DHS employees go to work dedicated to keeping America safe from terrorism; Federal funding of fusion centers was intended to advance that Federal objective. Fusion centers may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism, such as contributions to traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster response and recovery efforts. In this investigation, the Subcommittee confined its work to examining the Federal return on its extensive support of state and local fusion centers, using the counterterrorism objectives established by law, Executive strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments. The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’s own operations. But DHS and the centers do not shoulder sole responsibility for the fusion centers’ counterterrorism intelligence failures. Congress has played a role, as well. Since Congress created DHS in 2003, dozens of committees and subcommittees in both Houses have claimed jurisdiction over various aspects of the Department. DHS officials annually participate in hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits for Members of Congress and their staffs. At Congress’ request, the Department annually produces thousands of pages of updates, assessments and other reports. Yet amid all the Congressional oversight, some of the worst problems plaguing the Department’s fusion center efforts have gone largely undisclosed and unexamined. At its conclusion, this Report offers several recommendations to clarify DHS’s role with respect to state and local fusion centers. The Report recommends that Congress and DHS revisit the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers, in light of the investigation’s findings. It also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126564 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFusion CentersHomeland Security (U.S.)Intelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Criminal Intelligence: Manual for Analysts Summary: This manual offers criminal intelligence guidance to analysts from understanding relevant concepts and categories, through to specific components of the intelligence process. Specially, the manual clarifies evaluation sources of intelligence and data, focusing particularly on basic analytical techniques, including link analysis, event charting, flow analysis and telephone analysis. The manual also equips practitioners to develop inferences and present he results of their analysis. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2011. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf Shelf Number: 126802 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCriminal IntelligenceHandbooksIntelligence Gathering |
Author: Patel, Faiza Title: A Proposal for an NYPD Inspector General Summary: Over the last decade, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), like state and local law enforcement agencies around the country, has become increasingly involved in collecting counterterrorism intelligence. But the NYPD’s counterterrorism and intelligence gathering operations are unique among municipal police departments, both in size and character. The magnitude of these operations vastly exceeds that of similar efforts in other major cities: In 2010, the NYPD’s budget for counterterrorism and intelligence was over $100 million and the two divisions reportedly employed 1000 officers. Equally important, while New York City police cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on counterterrorism matters, they also conduct intelligence operations and investigations completely separate from federal authorities. The creation of this stand-alone capability was a stated goal of Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly, and is an accomplishment frequently highlighted by the Department. Unlike the FBI and other national intelligence agencies, the NYPD’s sizable counterterrorism and intelligence operations operate largely free from independent oversight. Currently, oversight of the NYPD – as conducted by the Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption and the Civilian Complaint Review Board – focuses almost exclusively on police corruption and individual police misconduct. The City-wide Department of Investigation similarly focuses on corruption, incompetence, and misconduct in 300 municipal agencies and, in any event, does not cover the police. The City Council has supervisory jurisdiction over the police, but has rarely examined its intelligence operations. Control mechanisms established by a 1980s consent decree largely have been eliminated. In the federal system, Congressional supervision informed by reports from independent inspectors general has been a crucial tool for increasing transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the realm of intelligence and counterterrorism. This oversight system was developed in the wake of the 1970s Congressional investigations into the FBI’s and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) illegal collection of intelligence about Americans, and both agencies have operated for decades under its strictures. Even after the September 11th attacks, this system continues to function well and has, in fact, been strengthened. The FBI, in particular, has benefitted from a robust inspector general who has contributed to the effectiveness of its counterterrorism programs through reviews of issues ranging from the need for the Bureau to develop a comprehensive risk assessment of the terrorist threat to its use of the new intelligence techniques that have been authorized over the last decade. Given that the NYPD has built an intelligence and counterterrorism capability more in line with the FBI than a traditional urban police force, it is time to build an oversight structure that is appropriate for its size and functions. An independent inspector general should be established for the NYPD. This would be an enormous step forward for police accountability and oversight for several reasons: • ENSURING TRANSPARENCY – The inspector general would be in a position to make policing more transparent, thus allowing the Mayor and the City Council to better exercise their oversight responsibilities and increase public confidence in policing. Reliable information about how policies and legal constraints are implemented is especially important in the context of intelligence operations, the specifics of which are often necessarily concealed. • PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES – As the NYPD continues its important work of keeping New Yorkers safe, the inspector general would have the mandate, expertise, and perspective to make sure that it does so consistent with our constitutionally guaranteed liberties. • REFORMING FROM WITHIN – The inspector general would be in a position to work with the police cooperatively to address any problems in the Department’s operations and to keep track of progress. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2013 at: http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/proposal-nypd-inspector-general Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/proposal-nypd-inspector-general Shelf Number: 128363 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismIntelligence GatheringPolice (New York City, U.S.)Police CorruptionPolice MisconductStop and Frisk |
Author: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Title: Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations Summary: The advent of social media sites has created an environment of greater connection among people, businesses, and organizations, serving as a useful tool to keep in touch and interact with one another. These sites enable increased information sharing at a more rapid pace, building and enhancing relationships and helping friends, coworkers, and families to stay connected. Persons or groups can instantaneously share photos or videos, coordinate events, and/or provide updates that are of interest to their friends, family, or customer base. Social media sites can also serve as a platform to enable persons and groups to express their First Amendment rights, including their political ideals, religious beliefs, or views on government and government agencies. Many government entities, including law enforcement agencies, are also using social media sites as a tool to interact with the public, such as posting information on crime trends, updating citizens on community events, or providing tips on keeping citizens safe. Social media sites have become useful tools for the public and law enforcement entities, but criminals are also using these sites for wrongful purposes. Social media sites may be used to coordinate a criminal-related flash mob or plan a robbery, or terrorist groups may use social media sites to recruit new members and espouse their criminal intentions. Social media sites are increasingly being used to instigate or conduct criminal activity, and law enforcement personnel should understand the concept and function of these sites, as well as know how social media tools and resources can be used to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and investigate criminal activity. To ensure that information obtained from social media sites for investigative and criminal intelligence-related activity is used lawfully while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected, law enforcement agencies should have a social media policy (or include the use of social media sites in other information-related policies). This social media policy should communicate how information from social media sites can be utilized by law enforcement, as well as the differing levels of engagement—such as apparent/overt, discrete, or covert—with subjects when law enforcement personnel access social media sites, in addition to specifying the authorization requirements, if any, associated with each level of engagement. These levels of engagement may range from law enforcement personnel “viewing” information that is publicly available on social media sites to the creation of an undercover profile to directly interact with an identified criminal subject online. Articulating the agency’s levels of engagement and authorization requirements is critical to agency personnel’s understanding of how information from social media sites can be used by law enforcement and is a key aspect of a social media policy. Social media sites and resources should be viewed as another tool in the law enforcement investigative toolbox and should be used in a manner that adheres to the same principles that govern all law enforcement activity, such as actions must be lawful and personnel must have a defined objective and a valid law enforcement purpose for gathering, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII). In addition, any law enforcement action involving undercover activity (including developing an undercover profile on a social media site) should address supervisory approval, required documentation of activity, periodic reviews of activity, and the audit of undercover processes and behavior. Law enforcement agencies should also not collect or maintain the political, religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or group, association, corporation, business, partnership, or organization unless there is a legitimate public safety purpose. These aforementioned principles help define and place limitations on law enforcement actions and ensure that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. When law enforcement personnel adhere to these principles, they are ensuring that their actions are performed with the highest respect for the law and the community they serve, consequently fostering the community’s trust in and support for law enforcement action. The Developing a Policy on the Use of Social Media in Intelligence and Investigative Activities: Guidance and Recommendations is designed to guide law enforcement agency personnel through the development of a social media policy by identifying elements that should be considered when drafting a policy, as well as issues to consider when developing a policy, focusing on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. This resource can also be used to modify and enhance existing policies to include social media information. All law enforcement agencies, regardless of size and jurisdiction, can benefit from the guidance identified in this resource. The key elements identified in this resource can be applied to “traditional” social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) and are also applicable as different and new types of social media sites emerge and proliferate. As a policy is developed, the agency privacy officer and/or legal counsel should be consulted and involved in the process. Additionally, many agencies have an existing privacy policy that includes details on how to safeguard privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and an agency’s social media-related policy should also communicate how these protections will be upheld when using information obtained from social media sites. Social media sites have emerged as a method for instantaneous connection among people and groups; information obtained from these sites can also be a valuable resource for law enforcement in the prevention, identification, investigation, and prosecution of crimes. To that end, law enforcement leadership should ensure that their agency has a social media policy that outlines the associated procedures regarding the use of social media-related information in investigative and criminal intelligence activities, while articulating the importance of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. Moreover, the same procedures and prohibitions placed on law enforcement officers when patrolling the community or conducting an investigation should be in place when agency personnel are accessing, viewing, collecting, using, storing, retaining, and disseminating information obtained from social media sites. As these sites increase in popularity and usefulness, a social media policy is vital to ensuring that information from social media used in criminal intelligence and investigative activities is lawfully used, while also ensuring that individuals’ and groups’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are diligently protected. Details: Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 29, 2013 at: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://it.ojp.gov/gist/Document/132 Shelf Number: 128845 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceCriminal InvestigationsInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringMedia and CommunicationsSocial Media |
Author: Price, Michael Title: National Security and Local Police Summary: The September 11, 2001 attacks prompted a national effort to improve information sharing among all levels of law enforcement, including on the local level. Federal money poured into local police departments so they could fulfill their new role as the "eyes and ears" of the intelligence community. But how do local police departments go about collecting intelligence? What guidance do they use? What standards or policies, if any, must they adhere to? To learn how state and local agencies are operating in this domestic intelligence architecture, the Brennan Center surveyed 16 major police departments, 19 affiliated fusion centers, and 14 JTTFs. What we found was organized chaos - a sprawling, federally subsidized, and loosely coordinated system designed to share information that is collected according to varying local standards. As detailed in the following report, this headlong rush into intelligence work has created risks that hurt counterterrorism efforts and undermine police work. The lack of oversight, accountability, and quality control over how police collect and share personal information about law-abiding Americans not only violates their civil liberties of Americans, but creates a mountain of data with little to no counterterrorism value. Details: New York: Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, 2013. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2014 at Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf Shelf Number: 131768 Keywords: CounterterrorismIntelligence GatheringInteragency CooperationNational SecurityPolicing Networks |
Author: Bynum, Timothy Title: Evaluation of a Comprehensive Approach to Reducing Gun Violence in Detroit Summary: Increasingly criminal justice agencies are integrating "data based" approaches into their operational strategies. This "new" model of criminal justice suggests that analysis of data on recent crime and violence incidents can lead to a more focused and targeted effort than previous enforcement efforts. Through such efforts, individuals, groups, and locations that exhibit a high level of gun violence within a limited geographic area are identified and a variety of intervention are then implemented. These interventions typically include both enforcement as well as offender focused interventions. These efforts differ from prior enforcement strategies in that they emphasize the integration of a problem analysis component in which data analysis is used to identify the patterns of gun violence in a small target area and enforcement resources are concentrated in this area. However, this approach also differs from previous "crackdown" enforcement strategies in that there are also community and offender intervention components that are integral to this model. The community component seeks to identify ways in which the community can be involved in working with law enforcement to reduce gun violence in this area. This is often through increased community meetings, and establishing more frequent and effective means of communication between the community and local law enforcement. In addition, the enforcement strategies used in this model are data and intelligence driven. As such they are focused on identifying the most problematic locations, groups and individuals that are most responsible for gun violence in this community. This report documents the implementation and outcomes of the implementation of Project Safe Neighborhoods in one of the jurisdictions in which this model was first implemented. Details: Unpublished report submitted to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2014. 69p. Source: Accessed May 5, 2014 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244866.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244866.pdf Shelf Number: 132234 Keywords: CollaborationCommunity Crime PreventionGun-Related ViolenceHomicideHot-SpotsIntelligence GatheringIntelligence-Led PolicingProject Safe NeighborhoodsViolent Crime |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border Summary: Federally led law enforcement task forces and intelligence information sharing centers are ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism, white-collar crime, public corruption, even intelligence sharing. This report focuses on those task forces and information sharing efforts that respond to federal counterdrug and counterterrorism priorities in the Southwest border region. More generally, the report also offers context for examining law enforcement coordination. It delineates how this coordination is vital to 21st century federal policing and traces some of the roots of recent cooperative police endeavors. Policy makers interested in federal law enforcement task force operations may confront a number of fundamental issues. Many of these can be captured under three simple questions: 1. When should task forces be born? 2. When should they die? 3. What overarching metrics should be used to evaluate their lives? Task forces are born out of a number of realities that foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts. These realities are particularly evident at the Southwest border. Namely, official boundaries often enhance criminal schemes but can constrain law enforcement efforts. Criminals use geography to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. At the same time, police have to stop at their own jurisdictional boundaries. Globalization may aggravate such geographical influences. In response, task forces ideally leverage expertise and resources-including money and manpower to confront such challenges. Identifying instances where geography, globalization, and criminal threat come together to merit the creation of task forces is arguably a process best left to informed experts. Thus, police and policy makers can be involved in highlighting important law enforcement issues warranting the creation of task forces. Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative policing efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two, and they can die through these same channels. While some clarity exists regarding the circumstances governing the creation of task forces, it is less clear when they should die and how their performance should be measured. Two basic difficulties muddy any evaluation of the life cycles of law enforcement task forces. First, and in the simplest of terms, at the federal level no one officially and publicly tallies task force numbers. The lack of an interagency "task force census" creates a cascading set of conceptual problems. - Without such information, it is challenging, if not impossible, to measure how much cooperation is occurring, let alone how much cooperation on a particular threat is necessary. - Concurrently, it may be difficult to establish when specific task forces should be disbanded or when funding for a particular class of task forces (e.g., violent crime, drug trafficking, counterterrorism) should be scaled back. - Additionally, how can policy makers ascertain whether task force programs run by different agencies duplicate each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category of criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? For example, do the violent crime task forces led by one agency complement, compete with, or duplicate the work of another's? To give a very broad sense of federal task force activity in one geographic area, CRS compiled a list of task forces and fusion centers operating along the Southwest border, which are geographically depicted in this report. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included. Second, there is no general framework to understand the life trajectory of any given task force or class of task forces. What key milestones mark the development and decline of task forces? (Can such a set of milestones even be produced?) How many task forces outlive their supposed value because no thresholds regarding their productivity are established? Though federal law enforcement has embraced the task force concept, it has not agreed on the breadth or duration of such cooperation. Such lack of accord extends to measuring the work of task forces. This report suggests a way of conceptualizing these matters by framing task force efforts and federal strategies tied to them in terms of input, output, and outcome-core ideas that can be used to study all sorts of organizations and programs, including those in law enforcement. An official task force census coupled with a conceptual framework for understanding and potentially measuring their operations across agencies could greatly assist policy making tied to federal policing throughout the country, and particularly along the Southwest border. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R43583: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf Shelf Number: 132554 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFusion CentersIntelligence GatheringOrganized CrimePartnershipsTerrorism |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing Summary: This report summarizes the discussions at a seminar organized and hosted by the RAND Corporation at which a group of acting and former senior government and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and experts examined domestic intelligence operations and information sharing as these relate to terrorist threats. The collective experience of the participants spanned the breadth of the homeland security apparatus. The participants included officials who have served or are serving in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DoD), state and local law enforcement agencies, first-responder organizations, and state-level homeland security agencies. A similar group met three years ago to discuss lessons learned from avoiding terrorist attacks at home, the role of DHS's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and the value and focus of fusion centers. One of the goals of the meeting reported here was to measure how much progress was being made (or not made, as the case may be) in several critical areas of homeland security. The seminar was conducted within RAND's continuing program of self-initiated research. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Shelf Number: 111284 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCriminal InvestigationsHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion CentersHomeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Carter, David Title: Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes Summary: The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic ways. One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government. Despite clear evidence of significant changes, very little research exists that examines issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies. Important questions on the nature of the issues that impact SLT intelligence practices remain. While there is some uncertainty among SLT law enforcement about current terrorism threats, there is certainty that these threats evolve in a largely unpredictable pattern. As a result there is an ongoing need for consistent and effective information collection, analysis and sharing. Little information is known about perceptions of how information is being shared between agencies and whether technologies have improved or hurt information sharing, and little is known about whether agencies think they are currently prepared for a terrorist attack, and the key factors distinguishing those that think they are compared to those who do not. This study was designed to address these issues, and a better understanding of these issues could significantly enhance intelligence practices and enhance public safety. To develop a better understanding of perceptions about terrorist threats that SLT agencies face and their efforts to prevent terrorism, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two separate groups of law enforcement personnel. Development of the survey involved several preliminary drafts. Feedback was sought from SLT intelligence workers about question content and coverage, and specifically whether questions were ambiguous or difficult to answer. After making revisions, the final Institutional Review Board approved instrument had 48 structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions. The survey, despite its length, enabled respondents to share information about issues such as perceptions of terrorist threats, inter-agency interactions, information sharing, intelligence training, and agency preparedness. Additional questions asked about characteristics of the respondent and the respondent's agency. There are three findings that are quite interesting. First, law enforcement perceptions about what is a serious threat in their community has changed significantly over time. Law enforcement is much more concerned about sovereign citizens, Islamic extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the fringe groups of the far right, including Christian Identity believers, reconstructed traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., survivalists), and members of doomsday cults. In fact, sovereign citizens were the top concern of law enforcement, but the concern about whether most groups were a serious terrorist threat actually declined for most groups (e.g., the KKK; Christian Identity; Neo-Nazis; Racist Skinheads; Extremist Environmentalists; Extreme Animal Rights Extremists). Second, when examining whether the respondents thought that various agencies and sources were useful in their counterterrorism efforts, the agencies that appear to be most useful to SLT law enforcement include state/local fusion centers, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force(s), the FBI, and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Overall, the internet and the use of open source materials, human intelligence sources, and the media were perceived as providing the most useful information. Security clearances, adequate personnel, adequate training, adequate resources, adequate time, or the organizational culture were all perceived as barriers for the sharing of intelligence and information across agencies. Third, several factors impacted whether an agency was prepared for a terrorist attack. Agencies with satisfied working relationships with state organizations were twice as likely to be prepared, agencies that produce threat assessments and risk assessments more frequently are three-and-a-half times more likely to be prepared than agencies who create them less frequently, and the creation of vulnerability assessments also appears to be a predictor of preparedness as they more than quadruple an agency's preparedness likelihood. In addition, as agencies experience problems related to personnel, training, and resources, the likelihood they will consider themselves prepared is reduced by approximately three-fold. Agencies that felt they were not prepared highlighted problems with resources, training, and quality of working relationships with other organizations. Particularly for practitioners, the most important aspect of this research may not be the findings on the variable analyses, per se, but on the benchmarks identified in trends found in the data. Some clear trends emerged which indicate programmatic successes for information sharing and intelligence, as well as areas where problems remain. When considering these findings in the context of research on organizational development, it is clear that organizational leadership is an important factor for organizational successes in information sharing as well as for preparedness. If the leadership of a law enforcement agency is willing to expend the effort to train personnel, develop partnerships, and participate in state, regional and national information sharing initiatives, then greater levels of success will be achieved. While one would intuitively assume this, the data empirically supports it. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133952 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence (U.S.)Extremist GroupsIntelligence GatheringIntelligence-Led PolicingLaw EnforcementTerrorism |
Author: Nolan, Andrew Title: Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions Summary: Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks has been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national interests of the United States. While considerable debate exists with regard to the best strategies for protecting America's various cyber-systems and promoting cybersecurity, one point of general agreement amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence both within the private sector and between the private sector and the government. Nonetheless, there are many reasons why entities may opt to not participate in a cyber-information sharing scheme, including the potential liability that could result from sharing internal cyber-threat information with other private companies or the government. More broadly, the legal issues surrounding cybersecurity information sharing - whether it be with regard to sharing between two private companies or the dissemination of cyber-intelligence within the federal government - are complex and have few certain resolutions. In this vein, this report examines the various legal issues that arise with respect to the sharing of cybersecurity intelligence, with a special focus on two distinct concepts: (1) sharing of cyberinformation within the government's possession and (2) sharing of cyber-information within the possession of the private sector. With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the federal government, the legal landscape is relatively clear: ample legal authority exists for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to serve as the central repository and distributor of cyber-intelligence for the federal government. Nonetheless, the legal authorities that do exist often overlap, perhaps resulting in confusion as to which of the multiple sub-agencies within DHS or even outside of DHS should be leading efforts on the distribution of cyber-information within the government and with the public. Moreover, while the government has wide authority to disclose cyber-intelligence within its possession, that authority is not limitless and is necessarily tied to laws that restrict the government's ability to release sensitive information within its possession. With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the private sector, legal issues are clouded with uncertainty. A private entity that wishes to share cyber-intelligence with another company, an information sharing organization like an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) or an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), or the federal government may be exposed to civil or even criminal liability from a variety of different federal and state laws. Moreover, because of the uncertainty that pervades the interplay between laws of general applicability - like federal antitrust or privacy law - and their specific application to cyberintelligence sharing, it may be very difficult for any private entity to accurately assess potential liability that could arise by participating in a sharing scheme. In addition, concerns may arise with regard to how the government collects and maintains privately held cyber-intelligence, including fears that the information disclosed to the government could (1) be released through a public records request; (2) result in the forfeit of certain intellectual property rights; (3) be used against a private entity in a subsequent regulatory action; or (4) risk the privacy rights of individuals whose information may be encompassed in disclosed cyber-intelligence. The report concludes by examining the major legislative proposal - including the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), and the Cyber Threat Sharing Act (CTSA) - and the potential legal issues that such laws could prompt. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: R43941: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf Shelf Number: 135398 Keywords: Cyber SecurityCybercrime (U.S.)Information SharingIntelligence GatheringInternet Crime |
Author: Cortes, Carlos Title: Communications Surveillance in Colombia: The Chasm between Technological Capacity and the Legal Framework Summary: Last year, media outlets revealed that the National Police of Colombia would operationalize the Single Platform for Monitoring and Analysis (Plataforma Uinica de Monitoreo y Anailisis, or PUMA), through which it would be able to intercept "what is spoken, written or sent from e-mails, Facebook, Twitter, Line, Viber, Skype, and, in short, any type of communication undertaken via the internet." More recently, last February, Semana magazine revealed that the military was reviewing e-mails and chats of those involved in the peace talks in Havana, Cuba. In both cases, the government put its spin on the news. In the first case, the government presented PUMA as nothing more than the replacement of an older system, and stressed that it would be subject to legal controls. In the second, the Colombian president quickly announced the formation of a commission to develop the country's policy on cybersecurity and cyberdefense. Nonetheless, the underlying issues remain unsolved. What is, in the end, the technical capacity of PUMA? Is it possible to review anyone's e-mails? Can the military access someone's chat history? Is intercepting a phone call the same thing as intercepting internet traffic? Although new scandals regarding state intelligence emerge periodically in Colombia, the state never clarifies how intelligence works in practice or what controls exist for its exercise. Meanwhile, as time moves on, intelligence schemes grow more sophisticated along with our cell phones and computers. An analog rotary-dial telephone is as obsolete as "crocodile cables" used to intercept calls. Nonetheless, as the market facilitates the process of obsolescence and the incorporation of new massive technologies, it tells us little about the devices that are simultaneously developed to monitor individuals. Technological changes tend to alter long-established assumptions regarding the reach of specific rights. Privacy is arguably the right that faces the most challenges in the digital environment. Yet regulatory and jurisprudential lacunae persist in terms of how technology affects the exercise of fundamental rights. The cases of PUMA and the military's spying on peace negotiators occurred soon after Colombia's adoption of its new Intelligence Law, which, in theory, corrects previous irregularities and aligns with modern surveillance. But is this truly the case? Do we have a regulation that preserves national security without compromising citizens' privacy and freedom of expression, among other rights? The goal of this book is to examine the Colombian legal and jurisprudential framework regarding communications surveillance in light of today's technologies. Phrased in the form of a hypothesis, the purpose is to demonstrate how intelligence-related laws and jurisprudence fail to ensure that potentially affected rights remain intact. To test this hypothesis, I address several aspects of the country's Intelligence Law that I selected somewhat arbitrarily: the interception of communications, surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum, and access to user data. This last point, which alone merits its own study, is developed as a complement to the first two. The book is divided as follows: The first chapter explains, from a technical point of view, the technologies that we use to communicate and that are used to monitor us. The second chapter explores the normative framework for communications surveillance. The third offers a comparative look at communications interception. Finally, the fourth chapter synthesizes the findings of the first three chapters in an effort to offer several conclusions. Details: Bogota: Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 3: Accessed May 23, 2015 at: http://www.dejusticia.org/files/r2_actividades_recursos/fi_name_recurso.683.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.dejusticia.org/files/r2_actividades_recursos/fi_name_recurso.683.pdf Shelf Number: 135766 Keywords: CommunicationsCyber-securityIntelligence GatheringNational SecurityPrivacySurveillance |
Author: Coyne, John William Title: Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: Anticipating Transnational Organised Crime Summary: Law enforcement strategic intelligence theory and practice has developed slowly as a result of intelligence-led policing methodologies and police cultural resistance. The implementation of "intelligence-led policing" - one of the most widely supported police management methodologies - has focused on tactical implementation of intelligence support. As a result, most law enforcement intelligence research, as well as organizational and professional intelligence doctrine, has had a sharp tactical focus which has centred on information collection, collation and sense-making at the street and case level. Since the late 1980s, law enforcement agencies have become increasingly aware that their capabilities have been surpassed by the number of criminal acts and their increasing complexity. This issue has been particularly evident with regards to transnational organized crime (TOC). Organised crime activities and interests have rapidly expanded from being localised, then nationalised, followed by regionalised and finally globalised making the threat that TOC poses to national and regional security significantly greater. This increased threat has been accompanied by an increase in the complexity of TOC structures and activities. Globally law enforcement agencies have experimented with, developed and implemented a range of police management methodologies to move from responsive to proactive paradigms in response to developments in the crime environment - especially TOC. The application of strategic intelligence in law enforcement has been viewed by some justice policy professionals and senior police officers as the means by which decision-making on strategy setting and policy, using incomplete or complex data sets, can be made more objective. In this context intelligence is used to make "sense" of the sheer volume of information now available. This becomes increasingly important in an age where the role of police has morphed from a simplistic response and enforcement activity to one of managing human security risk. The primary research question which guided this thesis was "How can strategic intelligence be used to support law enforcement decision-makers in preventing, detecting, disrupting, and investigating transnational organised crime". This research was underpinned by an interpretivist theoretical perspective. The research methodology allowed for the selection of an explorative approach, using case studies that then permitted the development of a new strategic intelligence framework. The complexity of the variables involved and the selected exploratory approach necessitated the use of multiple data collection methods incorporating a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework. This framework allowed for the use of inductive reasoning in theory development. It also highlighted the need to undertake a comparative approach that utilised historical and archival research, case study analysis and the application of triangulation given its capacity to provide a better understanding of strategic TOC intelligence. The thesis develops a hybrid conceptual model for strategic intelligence in law enforcement, which explains how strategic intelligence interacts and influences police management processes. The research provides an understanding of the impact of strategic intelligence across the range of strategic responses to transnational organised crime and the implications this has for police management and intelligence theory. Details: Brisbane: Queensland University of Technology, School of Justice, 2014. 313p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/71394/2/John_Coyne_Thesis.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/71394/2/John_Coyne_Thesis.pdf Shelf Number: 136165 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringIntelligence-Led PolicingOrganized CrimePolice Management |
Author: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: The US legal system on data protection in the field of law enforcement. Safeguards, rights and remedies for EU citizens Summary: In US law, there are a number of different legal sources that govern data protection in the field of federal law enforcement. This study first considers the two most important sources of data protection law-the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974. It then turns to the most significant methods of information collection that are available for ordinary criminal investigations and national security investigations and the data protection guarantees set down under the laws authorizing and regulating such information collection. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. Reasonableness is established if the search or seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, that is, a judicial order based on a showing of probable cause and on a particular description of the property to be searched and the items to be seized. Reasonableness can also be established if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements exists. In the data protection context, however, the application of the Fourth Amendment is relatively limited because of the third-party records doctrine which holds that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in personal data that they voluntarily turn over to third parties like financial institutions and communications providers. With regard to EU citizens, the Supreme Court has held that foreign citizens resident abroad are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Among U.S. laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the closest analogue to a European data protection law in that it seeks to regulate comprehensively personal data processing, albeit only with respect to federal government departments and agencies. It regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information, by all types of federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. At a general level, the Privacy Act contains most of the elements of the EU right to personal data protection. However, it only protects US citizens and permanent residents, not EU citizens. Furthermore, there are a number of exemptions available specifically for law enforcement agencies. As a result, the benefits of the proposed legislation on judicial redress for EU citizens are unclear. The proposed legislation contemplates three types of law suits, two of which are designed to protect the right of access to and correction of personal data, and one of which enables individuals to obtain compensation for unlawful disclosures of personal data. Since law enforcement agencies commonly exempt their data bases from the access requirements of the Privacy Act, the right of action for intentional or willful disclosures that cause actual damage is the only one that would be available on a general basis. In investigations involving ordinary crime, there are at least three different methods of personal data collection available to law enforcement officials: (1) use of private sources like commercial data brokers; (2) court and administrative subpoenas; (3) electronic surveillance and access to electronic communications based on a court order under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These information-gathering methods afford the same level of data protection for US and EU citizens. With respect to EU data protection law, however, some of these methods contain relatively few data protection guarantees. In the case of private sources of personal data, this is attributable to the absence of a comprehensive data protection scheme in the private sector and the vast quantities of personal information freely available to market actors and, consequently, also to law enforcement officials. With respect to the subpoena power and access to communications metadata and subscriber records (under the Stored Communications Act and the Pen Register Act), the lack of significant data protection guarantees is associated with the standard of "relevance" to any type of criminal investigation and the permissive application of that standard by the courts. The law and jurisprudence of "relevance," in turn, is driven by the failure of US law to recognize a robust privacy interest in the personal data held by corporate entities and other third parties. In investigations involving national security threats, which can involve both an intelligence and a law enforcement component, there are a number of additional means available to the government: (1) a special type of administrative subpoena known as a "national security letter"; (2) surveillance authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (3) any other form of intelligence gathering authorized by Executive Order 12,333 (and not covered by FISA). The information gathered through such methods can be shared with criminal prosecutors if relevant for law enforcement purposes. Foreign intelligence gathering, both inside and outside the United States, follows a two-track scheme, one for US persons and another for non-US persons. With the exception of FISA electronic and physical surveillance orders, the data protection guarantees afforded to non-US persons are minimal. The stated intent of Presidential Policy Directive 28 is to provide for stronger personal data protection for non-US persons, but it is difficult to come to any conclusions at this point in time on what effect it will have. More generally, even with respect to US persons, personal data protection under foreign intelligence law raises a couple of questions. The first concerns the point in time when the right to privacy is burdened by government action. The US government has suggested that in the case of bulk collection of personal data, harm to the privacy interest only occurs after the personal data is used to search, or results from a search of, the information included in the data base. This position stands in marked contrast with EU law, where it is well established that bulk collection, even before the personal data is accessed, is a serious interference with the right to personal data protection because of the number of people and the amount of personal data involved. The second question concerns the conditions under which personal data can be shared between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In the realm of data processing by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the European courts have emphasized that intrusive surveillance can only be conducted to combat serious threats that are carefully defined in law. They have also held that the information that results from such surveillance can only be used to combat those serious threats, whether to take national security measures or to prosecute the associated criminal offenses. In US law, by contrast, the law allows for intelligence to be transferred to the police and criminal prosecutors for any type of law enforcement purpose.. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 137049 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsData ProtectionFourth AmendmentIntelligence GatheringPrivacy Act of 1974Search and Seizure |
Author: U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Title: Law Enforcement Use of Cell-Site Simulation Technologies: Privacy Concerns and Recommendations Summary: Advances in emerging surveillance technologies like cell-site simulators – devices which transform a cell phone into a real-time tracking device – require careful evaluation to ensure their use is consistent with the protections afforded under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The United States' military and intelligence agencies have developed robust and sophisticated surveillance technologies for deployment in defense against threats from foreign actors. These technologies are essential to keeping America safe. Increasingly though, domestic law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels are using surveillance technologies in their every-day crime-fighting activities. In the case of cell-site simulators, this technology is being used to investigate a wide range of criminal activity, from human trafficking to narcotics trafficking, as well as kidnapping, and to assist in the apprehension of dangerous and violent fugitives. Law enforcement officers at all levels perform an incredibly difficult and important job and deserve our thanks and appreciation. While law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize technology as a tool to help officers be safe and accomplish their missions, absent proper oversight and safeguards, the domestic use of cell-site simulators may well infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the right to free association. Transparency and accountability are therefore critical to ensuring that when domestic law enforcement decide to use these devices on American citizens, the devices are used in a manner that meets the requirements and protections of the Constitution. After press reports alleged wide-spread use of cell-site simulation devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement, the Committee initiated a bipartisan investigation in April 2015. At the outset of the investigation, the use of these devices by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies was not well known, and in many instances, appeared to be shrouded in secrecy. This is partly due to the use of the technology by military and intelligence agencies and the need for sensitivity in national security matters. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, avoided disclosing not only its own use of the devices, but also its role in assisting state and local law enforcement agencies in obtaining and deploying these devices. Indeed, the Committee's investigation revealed that as part of the conditions for being able to sell cell-site simulators to state and local law enforcement, the manufacturers of these devices must first notify the FBI, and those agencies in turn must sign a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI that expressly prohibits them from publicly disclosing their use of this technology, even in prosecutions where the use of the technology was at issue. On April 24, 2015, the Committee sent letters to then-Attorney General Eric Holder and Homeland Security Director Jeh Johnson, requesting information about their agencies' use of cell-site simulators and the privacy concerns inherent with their use. During the course of the investigation, it became clear that the use of cell-site simulators by state and local law enforcement agencies was not governed by any uniform standards or policies. In an effort to determine how widespread this problem was, the Committee identified four cities of varying sizes and crime rates, along with two states, for the purpose of ascertaining the number and type of cell-site simulators in use, as well as the policies that were employed for their use. In particular, the Committee sent letters to the police departments in Washington, D.C.; Alexandria, Virginia; Sunrise, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation; and the Virginia State Police, requesting among other things, information regarding the number, the funding, and the use of these devices at the state and local level. Documents and information obtained by the Committee confirmed varying standards for employing cell-site simulation devices among federal, state, and local law enforcement. Notably, the documents and information revealed that when the Committee first began its investigation in April 2015, federal law enforcement entities could obtain a court’s authorization to use cell-site simulators by meeting a standard lower than probable cause — the standard to obtain a search warrant. On October 21, 2015 the Committee’s Subcommittee on Information Technology (the Subcommittee) held a public hearing on DOJ's and DHS’s use of cell-site simulators. 7 The hearing focused on the agencies’ policies and procedures for deploying cell-site simulation technology. In September 2015, five months into the Committee's investigation and with the hearing upcoming, DOJ announced a new policy for its use of cell-site simulation devices. Shortly thereafter, DHS followed suit with the announcement of a similar new policy. At the hearing, it became evident that prior to the Committee’s investigation, the component law enforcement entities of DHS and DOJ had different policies and procedures governing their use of this technology and the agencies were not always obtaining a probable cause based warrant prior to deploying these devices. The new policies substantially changed how the agencies obtain authorization to deploy cell-site simulation technology. The new policies also introduced a measure of uniformity to how the various component agencies of each department used cell-site simulators, and importantly, required the agencies to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause in the majority of situations. Details: Washington, DC: The Committee, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/THE-FINAL-bipartisan-cell-site-simulator-report.pdf Shelf Number: 147302 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceInformation TechnologyIntelligence GatheringSurveillance Technology |
Author: Police Foundation Title: Reducing Violent Crime in American Cities: An Opportunity to Lead. Summary: On the national level, crime remains historically low. However, this national aggregate paints a deceiving picture of crime in many major cities. Individual cities experienced grim spikes in violent crime from 2014 to 2015 and through 2016 as well. As such, defining violent crime levels based solely on the national aggregates and distributing federal resources accordingly does not address local realities. The national statistics do not depict the suffering endured by families and individuals living in communities plagued by violence, nor do they depict the frustration felt by local law enforcement leaders who often are seen as responsible officials in their communities. Unfortunately for these leaders and the communities they serve, the federal support actually received to help combat violent crime is often calculated based on national statistics and the perspective of decision-makers in Washington, D.C. At the federal level, law enforcement agencies are tasked with a variety of missions and often cannot or do not prioritize localized violent crime over enforcing other laws and addressing other priorities. The mixture of varied prioritization, flat or reduced funding, traditional approaches, and limited authorities stifles an effective federal response despite the best intentions, hard work, and bravery of federal special agents, investigators, professional staff, and their agencies. Chapter 1 of this report provides a contextual overview and supporting data on the spike in localized violent crime in major cities, a review of the major drivers of crime, and an assertion that federal support is critical. Because collection and aggregation of crime data is disparate in police departments across the country, the extent of the increase in violent crime is difficult to specify. However, one important indicator is that the 2015 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data1 show an increase in all violent crime types from 2014 to 2015. In addition, a survey of major city police chiefs ranked gang violence (87.8%), drug-related disputes (79.6%), and access to illegal firearms (71.4%) as the top drivers of violent crime. The chapter asserts that despite the generally low levels of crime throughout the nation, the federal government must continue to prioritize violent crime and public safety concerns and focus its attention on local public safety crises, as a number of jurisdictions across the country live in a constant state of fear. What is required from federal agencies, is leadership in propelling an agenda in which violent crime is both a budgetary and policy priority and in addressing problems with evidence-based solutions. Chapter 2 reviews broad federal law enforcement priorities, roles, resources, and accountability in the context of the nation’s fight against violent crime. A Police Foundation study found that while local law enforcement receives federal resources, many of these resources are allocated according to factors other than what is affecting local communities. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes violent crime as its eighth priority, well behind its number one priority of fighting terrorism. Moreover, no federal agency prioritizes violent crime as its most important issue. Accordingly, the new Administration and Congress must make violent crime, and the federal government’s interest in violent crime, a top priority and be willing to dedicate the resources needed to assist in places where public safety is jeopardized. Major city chiefs interviewed stressed the need for better partnerships in combatting violent crime. Federal policy leaders must work with local law enforcement to improve federal support to fight violent crime. Using the latest crime data, federal, state, and local partnerships, based on shared decision-making and coproduction of public safety, is critical. Chapter 3 provides a detailed examination of the tools that federal law enforcement agencies provide to support those on the state and local levels to address violent crime. The data presented provides an overview of federal initiatives, tools, and roles that have shown evidence of sustainable success in reducing violent crime. Major city police chiefs provided information on federal law enforcement agencies, programs, and tools that have assisted them and stated that the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) show the most interest in prioritizing violent crime. They also found federal support through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) and the National Tracing Center (NTC) to be the most useful tools. Chapter 4 reviews the importance of U.S. Attorneys in fighting violent crime. It provides information indicating that police chiefs consider the support of U.S. Attorneys to be critical in fighting localized violent crime. Acting as the chief federal law enforcement officer in each judicial district, U.S. Attorneys must act as chief conveners to lead strategic collaborations that build strong federal cases that will impact localized violent crime. This chapter also stresses that the fight against violent crime and criminal justice reform are not mutually exclusive. Chapter 5 provides a detailed review of the impact of firearms availability on violent crime in the U.S. Law enforcement executives expressed their concerns that the most significant threat to the Second Amendment is the misuse of firearms and the ability of criminals to access them. Gun trafficking, illegal gun markets, theft, and illegal diversion are important issues that have not been addressed sufficiently. Legislation and federal tools available to regulate illegal gun markets and keep guns out of the hands of those looking to cause harm are inadequate. Background checks, for example, should be retooled and strengthened, and laws that restrict the effectiveness of federal law enforcement in enforcing them should be eliminated. This report is not intended as a criticism of any previous Presidential Administration, its leaders or appointees, or of the hardworking, professional men and women in federal law enforcement agencies, many of whom began their careers as state or local law enforcement officers. Instead, this report looks toward the new Administration, which has an opportunity to leverage the lessons of the past and lead a legacy of change for the future. In doing so, it will have the opportunity to set forth a new strategy to keep national crime rates at historically low levels while reducing disparate impacts in our major cities and elsewhere. The recommendations in this report create an overarching, new strategy to understand and address violence in today’s cities. They include prioritization and non-traditional approaches, openness and sharing of data, expansion of available technologies, and calls for immediate Congressional and Executive Branch action. The recommendations presented in this report echo similar concerns expressed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors where New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu presented information regarding a forthcoming report, entitled Securing America, to the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) at its October 2016 meeting. The MCCA members expressed substantial concurrence with the forthcoming report. Details: Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PF-MCCA_Reducing-Violent-Crime-in-American-Cities_FullReport_RGB.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PF-MCCA_Reducing-Violent-Crime-in-American-Cities_FullReport_RGB.pdf Shelf Number: 144883 Keywords: Crime PreventionEvidence-Based PracticesGun-Related ViolenceIntelligence GatheringViolenceViolence PreventionViolent Crime |
Author: Barker, Cat Title: Oversight of intelligence agencies: a comparison of the 'Five Eyes' nations Summary: Executive summary - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States each have some combination of parliamentary/congressional, independent and judicial oversight of their intelligence agencies, in addition to accountability through the executive branch. However, there are differences in the nature and scope of each of those components. - The six agencies comprising the Australian intelligence community are overseen by a parliamentary committee that examines their administration and expenditure and an independent Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, who examines the legality and propriety of their activities. Most of the agencies' activities and powers are authorised by the responsible ministers. A review completed in June 2017 recommended that the remits of the committee and the Inspector-General be expanded to include four additional agencies, and that the Inspector-General's resources be significantly increased. - Canada has passed legislation creating a committee of parliamentarians to review the policy, administration, finance and operations of Canada's national security and intelligence community. At present, only two agencies are subject to dedicated independent expert review for lawfulness. Canada's national police force, which has responsibility for investigating security offences, is subject to independent expert review. However, this review is limited to handling public complaints about police officer conduct and, with the consent of the Public Safety Minister, undertaking public interest studies of specified activities. A Bill has been introduced that would create a single expert review body mandated to investigate complaints made in relation to the activities of three agencies and to examine the lawfulness, reasonableness and necessity of all national security and intelligence activities undertaken in the federal government. The Bill also proposes the creation of an Intelligence Commissioner to give final approval to certain activities undertaken by Canada's signals intelligence and security intelligence agencies. - New Zealand's Intelligence and Security Act 2017 replaces the four acts that previously applied to the two intelligence and security agencies and their oversight bodies, and implements recommendations from the first periodic review of the agencies. The agencies are overseen by a parliamentary committee, which scrutinises their policies, administration and expenditure, and an independent Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security who ensures that the agencies act with propriety and operate lawfully and effectively. Intelligence warrants may be issued by a responsible minister either solely, or jointly with a Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. - In the United Kingdom, the main focus of the Intelligence and Security Committee is to oversee the expenditure, administration, policies and (with some limitations) operations of the three key intelligence agencies, though it has scope to examine the work of other intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies too. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides independent oversight of the use of intrusive powers by the three key intelligence agencies. The Commissioner, along with several judicial commissioners, is required to keep under review the exercise by public bodies of various statutory functions, and may be directed by the Prime Minister to review any other functions of the three key intelligence agencies. Legislation has been passed under which warrants, currently issued by ministers, will only come into force after being reviewed by a judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal investigates complaints about public bodies' use of investigatory powers. - The United States intelligence community comprises 17 executive branch entities. Congressional oversight of the intelligence community is spread across several committees, including specialised committees on intelligence in the House and the Senate. While each has some limits on what it may examine, taken collectively the committees have the ability to inquire into all of the intelligence-related activities of the US Government. The Executive Office of the President houses several key mechanisms for overseeing the intelligence community, including the President's Intelligence Advisory Board and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. These are augmented by a network of Inspectors General and legal counsels. In addition to Inspectors General attached to specific agencies and departments, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community conducts audits, inspections and investigations of cross-cutting programs and activities. The federal judiciary examines a wide range of intelligence activities under a number of laws, including the Constitution. Most notably, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews applications for warrants related to the collection of foreign intelligence by the US Government. - Despite differences in the approach taken, each of the five countries has developed a framework that includes a system of checks and balances that spans the various branches of government, and which aims to ensure that agencies are accountable for both their administration and expenditure and the legality and propriety of their activities. - The intelligence communities have evolved to meet new challenges as they arise, and will continue to do so. It will be important for the oversight arrangements to keep pace with such changes. Details: Canberra: Australia Department of Parliamentary Services, 2017. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper Series, 2017-18: Accessed March 13, 2018 at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/5689436/upload_binary/5689436.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/5689436/upload_binary/5689436.pdf Shelf Number: 149444 Keywords: Intelligence GatheringNational Security |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence Summary: Who the Handbook is for - This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support countries in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by all actors involved in the prison system, including policymakers, legislators, prison managers, prison intelligence officers and prison staff. Members of other law enforcement bodies, non-governmental organizations and other individuals interested or active in the field of criminal justice and prison reform may find it of interest. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as a training tool. What the Handbook covers - The theme of the Handbook is prison security-the means by which escapes and other crimes are prevented. Its main focus is on the contribution made by dynamic security and highlights one particular element of dynamic security-prison intelligence -which provides important intelligence for use within the prison to prevent escapes and maintain order and control. Prison intelligence can also be used more widely by criminal justice, law enforcement and security bodies and agencies to prevent prisoners from within the prison directing criminal activity taking place outside the prison. For example, conducting organized crime-related activities, terrorist or gang activity, drug trafficking, intimidating or corrupting witnesses, judiciary, lawyers or jurors. Chapter 1 describes the three key elements in the prison security frameworkphysical security, procedural security and dynamic security-and sets those within the context of international human rights instruments. It makes clear that effective security and human rights are compatible and both can be delivered within a well-managed prison. The four main high-level security functions (categorization and assessment, accounting and control, searching, communications and surveillance) are described, and related objectives and baselines identified. The importance of security risk assessment and security risk indicators is also explored. Dynamic security and the importance of staff directly supervising and engaging with prisoners is the focus of chapter 2. It highlights the need for staff to communicate with prisoners, have regular contact with prisoners, establish professional relationships and involve themselves in prisoners' daily lives. The importance of preventing the conditioning and manipulation of staff is explored. The second part of the chapter emphasizes another element of dynamic security-putting in place a programme of constructive activities that provides prisoners with opportunities to change and develop, gain qualifications, and maintain their health and intellectual and social functioning. It makes the point that such programmes contribute to prison security by keeping prisoners active and occupied. Chapter 3 focuses on defining what is meant by intelligence, before going on to explain the rationale for intelligence gathering in prisons. It describes types of intelligence and provides definitions for key terms used by intelligence practitioners. The chapter looks at the policy and organization required for an effective intelligence operation in prisons. It goes on to describe the role and function of a Prisons Intelligence Unit. The need for having effective safeguards in place is highlighted. The issues of internal and external coordination are explored and the importance of multi-agency working emphasized. The role and benefits of having prison-based police intelligence officers is discussed. The use of covert surveillance measures and prisoner informers involves a careful balancing of a prisoners rights against the need to investigate serious criminality and is considered at the end of the chapter. The final chapter, chapter 4, outlines the intelligence cycle, its components and principles. It describes in detail the key elements of the intelligence cycle: tasking, collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, dissemination and re-evaluation. Examples of various intelligence-related template forms are provided in the annexes. Details: New York: UNODC, 2015. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 18, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Handbook_on_Dynamic_Security_and_Prison_Intelligence.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Handbook_on_Dynamic_Security_and_Prison_Intelligence.pdf Shelf Number: 153020 Keywords: Correctional Administration Correctional Institutions Intelligence GatheringPrison Administration Prison Security Prisons |